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JANUARY, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND TWENTY-SEVEN
"My keenest interest is excited, not by what are called great questions and
'great ca.ses but by little decisions which the cominon run of selectors would pass
by because they did not deal with the Constitution, or a telephonecoynpany, yet
which have in them the germ of some wider theory, and therefore sone profound
interstitial change in the very tissue of the law"--Mr. Justice Holmes, Collected
Legal Essays, p 269.
NOTES ON RECENT MISSOURI CASES
PLEADING-INCONSISTENT DEFENSES-RULEIN MISSOURI.
Caldwell v. City of New York Ins. Co.,
This was an action on a policy ofinsurance on an automobile. The answer
contained a denial of each and every allegation of the petition except that
the-defendant is a corporation. It also alleged fraud in the procurement in that
there was a chattel mortgage and a prior policy of insurance on the car. The
Kansas City Court of Appeals held that these were inconsistent defenses, as
it was an attempt to plead a general denialwith a plea in confession and avoid-
ance and refused to allow the defenses to stand together.
There seems to be a great deal of confusion both as to whether inconsist-
ent defenses maybe pleaded, and also as to when defenses are inconsistent. At
early common law, inconsistent defenses were not permitted. The rule was
that defendant could only plead one plea, as otherwise, the defense would be
bad for duplicity.2 This old idea of pleading but a single defense was objection-
able, and the abuses and limitations of this common-law method caused the
adoption of the Statute of 4 Anne, Chapter 16, Section 4 (1706).3
At first, under the Statute of Anne, there could not be pleaded anything
that was inconsistent as a matter of law as well as a matter of fact.' Later
the rule was relaxed so that there could be only the objection that the defenses
were inconsistent in fact.5 In the first half of the 19th century came the adop-
1. (1922) 245 S. W. 602. 4. Roe v. Rogers (1853) 8 How. Pr. 356;
2. Auburn & 0. Canal Co. v. Leitch (1847) 4 Arthur v. Brooks (1853) 14 Barb.S33;Williamsv.
Denio 65 (dictum). Harris (1837) 2 How. (Miss.) 627. (dWaum).
3. "It shall be lawful for any defendant or S. Wilson v. Ames (1814) S Taut. 340,
tenant in any court or suit, or for any plaintiff in non tenure, infancy, nothing in arrear permitted.
replevin in any court of record, with leave of the as not inconsistent. 2ierry v. Gay (1825) 3
court, to plead as many several matters thereto Pick. 388. non rig factum, and payment, not
as he shall think necessary for his defence." inconsistent.
(35)
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tion of the Codes of the various states. We are interested only in the code of
this state adopted in 1849. 6 Our code permits several defenses and in effect
closely follows the Statute of Anne.a It does not contain an express prohibi-
tion against pleading inconsistent defenses but provides that "different con-
sistent defenses may be separately stated in the same answer."' i, It always
has been the rule that each defense must be separately stated and consistent
within itself.7 It is only with inconsistency between separate pleas that this
note deals.
There is a division of authority on the question of inconsistency. Some
states expressly permit them in their codes.8 Where there are no such specific
provisions, thereis alack of clarityin the various rules thatlhave been adopted.9
The first Missouri case found wherein there was an attempt to define incon-
sistency, and to lay down any definite rule, is Nelson v. Brodhack (1809).0
There Bliss, J., said: "Some interpretation, then, of the term 'consistent
defenses' should be adopted, if possible, that shall be consistent with the
statute and secure the rights of full defense. That right will be secured if the
consistency required be one of fact merely, and if two or more defenses are
held to be inconsistent only when the proof of one necessarily disproves the
other. Two statements are not inconsistent if both may be true." Many
Missouri cases since then state the same rule; but there seems to be some in-
consistency in the application of the rule.
Previous to the rule as stated in Nelson v. Brodhack, supra, the courts in
Missouri had not made a very clear analysis of the problem.t"
The first case decided after Nelson v. Brodhack, supra, is Fulgate v. Pierce.ti
There the court held that a denial of plaintiffs' ancestor's title under which they
claim, and an allegation that defendant claims title from one of plaintiffs were
inconsistent. This decision was based upon the ground that defendant could-
6. Laws 1849, Art. VI. Sec. 7, Sec. 8; R. S.
1855, p. 1232, Sec. 12; Sec. 13; Sec. 12 to 13, 1865;
Sec. 3522 to 3523, R. S. 1879; Sec. 2050 to 2051,
R. S. 1889; Sec. 605 to 606, R. S. 1899; Sec. 1879
to 1808, R. S. 1909; Sec. 1232, 1233 and 1234,
R. S. 1919.
6a. The first legislation in Missouri on the
matter of inconsistent defenses appears in the
R. S. of 1825, page 626, sec. 17, which reads:
"The defendant in all actions may plead as
many several matters, whether of law or fact,
as he shall think proper." In the Revision of 1834,
page 459, sec. 24 appears this statute: "The
defendant may plead as many several pleas as he
shall think necesary for his defense, subject to
the power of the court to compel him to elect
by which plea he will abide in case where he may
plead inconsistent pleas." The same appears in
the Revision of 1845, page 813, sec. 27.
The above statutes were dropped and Art. VI
sec. 8 of Laws 1849 adopted, which reads, "The
defendant may set forth in his answer as many
grounds of defense as he shall have. They shall
be separately stated, and may refer to the cause of
action they are intended to answer, in any manner
in which they may be intelligibly distinguished."
In the R. S. 1855, page 1233, sec. 14, appears
this statute which appears also in the R. S. of
1919, sec. 1234: "Two or more defendants making
the same defense shall answer jointly. Different
consistent defenses may be separately stated in
the same manner."
Apparently the rule should be as stated in the
R. S. of 1834, that defendant should be able to
plead as many several pleas as lie shall think
necessary for his defense, subject to tile power
of the court to compel him to elect Isy which plea
he will abide, in cases where lie may plead in-
consistent defenses.
7a. R. S. of Missouri, 1919, sec. 1234.
7. Hensley v. Tartar (1860) 14 Cal. 508;
Buddington v. Davis (1851) 6 How. Pr. 401.
8. Sec. 7261, Compiled Code of Iowa, 1919.
9. Seattle National Bank v. Jones (1895) 13
Wash. 281, 43 Pac. 331, 48 L. R. A. 177. Conlra:
Banta v. Siller (1898) 121 Cal. 414, 53 Pac. 935:
Bell v. Brown (1863) 22 Cal. 671; Buhne v.
Corbett (1872) 43 Cal. 264.
10. (1869)44 Mo. 596.
11. Atterbury v. Powell (1860) 29 Mo. 429;
Coble v. Daniel (1863) 33 Mo. 363; Klnman v.
Carmefox (1863) 34 Mo. 147; Sheppard v. Starrett
(1865) 35 Mo. 367; Darrett v. Donnelly (1866) 18
Mo. 492.
12. (1872)49 Mo. 441.
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not both wholly contest plaintiffs' tide and also rely upon the same tide to
sustain joint possession. In Rhine v. MontgomeryU the court held a general
denial, self defense, and use of reasonable force in ejecting plaintiff from the
premises of the defendant consistent. The only way these defenses could be
"consistent isto construe the general denial as a denial of the alleged unlawful-
ness of the assault.
In Grady v. A4merican Century Ins. Co.," an action on an insurance policy,
the court suggests the defenses that the policy was forged and that there was
a violation of the terms of the policy were inconsistent, when in fact both may
have been true in fact. Ledbetter v. Ledbetter's shows a liberal viewpoint. There
the court said that unless defendant expressly admits the plaintiff's title in an
equitable defense to an ejectment suit plaintiff would have to prove title
under the general denial.
In Cohn v. Lehman,16 the court said, that "Defenses are inconsistent only
when one fact contradicts the other, and has nothing to do with theseeming
and logical inconsistency that arises merely from a denial and a plea in confes-
sion and avoidance." The same idea was expressed in McCormick v. Ac Kaye. 7
The court there held that a general denial, justification of trespass on land un-
derorders of a road overseer, and the statute of limitations were not inconsist-
ent, as proof of one, did not necessarily disprove the other. This result seems
doubtful. Also a plea of non estfactum and nonperformance of terms of an al-
leged contract were held not inconsistent in Cox v. Bishop.18
In State ex inf. v. Fireman Fund Insurance Co.,"9 the Supreme Court seems
to have departed from the rule laid down in earlier cases, when in an extraor-
dinaryproceeding to oust the defendant for alleged violation of statute against
pools, trusts, etc., the court held that a general denial, and plea that the statute
was unconstitutional and void, admitted the guilty acts, or otherwise the pro-
ceeding would be in the nature of a moot proceeding.
State ex inf. v. Delmar Jockey Clubto also seems to go contra to the general
rule. The court, in an action in the nature of a quo warranto alleging violations
of law and non user, said that "a general denial does not raise an issue if follow-
ed by a special plea of confession and avoidance." The case of 4terbury
v. N~ichols21 follows the latter rule. The court held an answer alleging failure
of consideration and damages for breach of warranty notinconsistent in Brod-
crick v. dndrews22 and Plais de Costume Co. v. Beach.23 But a general denial
and breach of warranty were held inconsistent in Shoe Co. v. cDonald.2 4
In Bank v. Hoppe,u an assignment was alleged in the answer. The reply
contained a denial of any assignment, and if an assignment had been made it
was fraudulent. These were held not inconsistent; Blood v. IVoodmen of
World" is to the same effect.
Lempee Land and Implement Co. v. Speings2- holds a plea of misjoindure
of parties and a prayer for affirmative relief on a counterclaim inconsistent,
and that the defense of misjoindure was waived. (This seems wrong under the
13. (1872) 50 Mo. 566. 21. (1907) 127 Mo. App. 47, 106 S. W. 111.
14. (1875) 60 Mo. 116. 22. (1908) 13S Mo. App.S7, 115 S. %.S19
15. (1885) 88 Mo. 60. 23. (1910) 144 Mo. App. 456. 129 S. IV. 270.
16. (1887) 93 Mo.574, 6 S. W. 267. 24. (1909) 138 Mo. App. 328. 122 S. W. S.
17. (1890) 41 Mo. App. 263. 25. (1901) 132 Mo. App. 449, 111 S. W. 1190.
18. (1894) 55 Mo. App. 135. 26. (1909) 140 Mo. App. 526, 120S. W. 700.
19. (1899) 152 Mo. 1, 52 S. IV. 595. 27. (1911) 236 Mo. 33, 139S. XV. 345.
20. (1906) 200 Mo. 34.
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rule.) Ewen v. Hart28 holds a denial and license in an action of trespass
inconsistent.
In suit on a promissory note, St. Louis Trust Co. v. Laughlin,29 defenses that
theindorsement was for plantiff's accommodation, that itwas procured by mis-
representation concerningsecurities in the payee's hands, and that the payee
promised but failed to secure additional security, where held not technically
inconsistent, as proof of one would not disprove the other. And in Woodson
v. Williams,3° an answer, in an action for slander, contained a general denial,
and a plea of justification, and a plea in mitigation which were held not to be
inconsistent.
It would seem that within certain limits inconsistent defenses ought to be
permitted. This feeling on the part of the court is indicated by the fact that
they refuse to hold as inconsistent defenses which clearly are so. It would
seem unjust to deprive a defendant of every lawful defense. He may have some
proof of two inconsistent defenses, and may not with safety alone rely oii one
defense; or he may not know which one is true; and hence be compelled to
elect might work a hardship. He may not know which defense is true but if he
has evidence tending to show that both defenses are true there seems no grave
objection, assuming of course that he is in good faith, in making both defenses
and in submitting the matter to the jury for its determination. This point of
view is illustrated by a Minnesota case.31 Suit was brought on an accident
policy. Defendant pleaded, first, suicide of the insured; second, that plaintiff,
the beneficiary, murdered the insured. It was held that these defenses might
both be pleaded. Obviously, both cannot be true in fact, yet defendant in this
situation might very well have very little ability to fully know the cause of
death, yet have evidence tending to prove both defenses which he desired to
have the jury consider.
Though considerations of policy might well prevent pleading defenses that
are in fact inconsistent, there seems no justification for a hard and fast rule
against pleading a general denial and a defense in confession and avoidance
or discharge. No rule should be adopted which would prevent the pleading and
proof of several defenses that may be true in fact.
LYNN ADAMS.*
EASEMENTS BY IMPLICATION-IMPLIED RESERVATION. Bales
v. Butts.1
A owned a five-acre tract of land on which were two residences. On Octo-
ber 16, 1920, he contracted in writing to sell the plaintiff the south part of said
tract, on which was one of the houses. An underground water pipe, passing
over the other tract, connected this house with a city main. The contract,
which made no reference to the water pipe, was not recorded, but plaintiff took
possession under it. On April 2, 1921, A conveyed the north part of the tract to
defendant without express mention of the water pipe. Defendant severed the
pipe, and plaintiff, on October 7, 1922, brought suit asking for a mandatory
injunction to compel defendant to restore said connection. A conveyed the
28. (1914) 183 Mo. App. 107, 166 S. W. 315. *Much material for this note was collected by
29. (1923) 254 S. W. 844 (Mo. Sp. Ct.). George E. Woodruff, LL.B. 1925.
30. (1918) 204 S. W. 183 (Mo. Sp. Ct.).
31. McAlpine v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. 1. (1925)274S. W. 679.
(1916) 134 Minn. 192, 158 N. W. 967.
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south part to plaintiff on October 31, 1923, after the suit was brought. Since
at the time the petition was filed, plaintiff was in possession under an agree-
ment to purchase, the legal title was still in A, and if an easement existed it
must be implied by reservation to A in the deed A made to defendanton April
2, 1921. The Supreme Court refused the relief on the ground that no easement
was reserved by implication.
Had the plaintiff received his deed from A before A conveyed to the de-
fendant, then he no doubt could have claimed an easement across defendant's
land by implied grant, for it is usually held that a grant carries with it all
those easements which are necessary to the reasonable enjoyment of the prop-
erty granted.2 Not only did the court in the principal case deny the plaintiff
an easement by implied reservation, but by its opinion it indicated that such
easements could be implied only in cases of strict necessity. The result of the
decision seems correct, but on principleshould easements byimplied reservation
be confined to cases of strict necessity?
It is a familiar rule that extrinsic evidence may not be adduced to vary or
contradict the language of a deed, but an exception was early made in the case
of ways of necessity, for it is pro bonop ublico that the land shall not be unoccu-
pied'. The exception, originally restricted to ways of necessity, has been ex-
tended so as to include easements other than ways. Mutual orreciprocal ease-
ments such as cross easements of support, have been designated as another
exception, 4 although one well known author plausibly insists that these so-call-
ed mutal easements are in fact only a form of an easement of necessity.5 Aside
from these exceptions, how far should the doctrine be carried? A familiar
principle of construction is that a grantor shall not derogate from his grant.
When a grantor conveys the fee to land, free and unencumbered, he presuma-
bly conveys the exclusive and absolute dominionoverit. But if it is subject to
an easement, it is not free and unencumbered, for the easement constitutes an
encumbrance upon the land,6 and is held to be a breach of thecovenant against
encumbrances.7 An easement created by implied reservation, however, is not
a breach of the covenant against encumbrances,8 for if the easement were ex-
pressly reserved in the deed, the covenants must apply to the premises granted,
that is, to an estate with an easement reserved or carved out of the fee, and in
the case of an implied reservation, the law reserved the easement, and the
covenants apply to the estate with the easement reserved.9 It would seem that
the grantor ought not be permitted to reserve an easement by implication and
thus to impose an encumbrance upon the land granted, as such an encumbrance
may be -unsuspected by the grantee, and against it the covenants for title in
the deed furnish no protection whatsoever. On the grantor should be imposed
2. Wheeldon v. Burrows (1879), L. R. 12 Ch. Wheeldon %. Burrows (1879), 12 Ch. Dii'. 31;
Div. 31; Bussmeyer v. Jablonsky (1912), 241 Mo. Adams v. Marshall (188S), 138 Mass. 228.
681, 145 S. AV. 772; Mullins v. Metropolitan 5. Tiffany., Real Property. Vol. 11, page 1294.
St. Ry. Co. (1907), 126 Mo. App. 507, 104 S. W. 6. Kellogg v. Malin (1872), 50 Mo. 496.
890; Hall v. Morton (1907), 125 Mo. App. 315, 7. Kunkle v. Beck (1913), 1 Ohio App. 70;
102 S. W 570; Peters v. Worth (1901), 164 Mo. Ensign v. Colt (1902), 75 Conn. 111, 52 At. 946;
431, 64 S. W. 490; Seidel v. Bloeser (1898), Weiss v. Binnian (1899), 178 Ill. 241. S2 N. E.
77 Mo. App. 172; Fitzpatrick v. MAik (1887), 24 969; MleGowen v. Myers (1882), 60 Ia. 256. 14
Mo. App. 435. N. W. 788; Kellogg v. Malin (1872), SO Mo. 496.
3. Clark v. Cogge (1607), Cro. Jac. 170; 8. Reed v. Blum (1921), 215 M ch. 247, 183
Dutton v. Taylor (1701), 2 Lutsyche 1487. N. WN. 766.
4. Richards v. Rose (1853), 9 Ex. 218; 9. Brighamv.Smith(185S)4Gray(70 ass.)
297.
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the duty of reserving such rights expressly in the grant.1 0 Nevertheless on the
question as to whether, on the severance of a tenement by the owner, lie can
claim an easement by implied reservation there is still a controversy. The
affirmative is implied in the decision of Pyer v. Carter," -where no distinction
is made between implied grants and implied reservations. Courts following
Pryer v. Carter undoubtedly would permit plaintiff to recover in the principal
case, for it holds that a purchaser buys the tenement "such as it is." But later
English cases have overruled that part of Pryer v. Carter, and distinguish
clearly between implied grants and implied reservations. Consequently, in
England an easement will be implied in favor of the grantee when reasonably
necessary, but not in favor of the grantor except in case of strict necessity.11
In a few jurisdictions in this country the courts do not make any distincition
between implied grants and implied reservations"3. The weight of authority,
however, recognizes a distinction, and there seems to be an increasingly marked
tendency to hold that there can be no reservation of an easement by implica-
tion unless the easement is strictly necessary."
It is submitted that the latter view is preferable. There seems no good
reason for relaxing the ordinary rule of construction in favor of the grantor.
It is so easy for him, in conveying.a piece of land, to express a limitation in-
tended to be reserved over the land that the necessity of raising any such reser-
vation by implication is hardly apparent. 5 If a reservation of an easement was
intended but omitted from the deed by error, he could file a bill to correct the
mistake. Furthermore, the recording acts do not furnish a purchaser any
protection against these servitudes imposed by law. The stability and security
of a registry system lies in the fact that a buyer may rely upon the public
records as information of all the conveyances and upon the words of the in-
struments for all rights thereunder. But in a particular chain of title there ap-
pears nothing in reference to an easement implied by law. "If we adopt any
other rule than thatof strict necessity, we open a door to doubt and uncertainty,
to the disturbance and questioning of titles, and to controversies as to matters
of fact outside of the language or bundaries of the deed. If an estate, fully
granted without exception or reservation, can be encumbered forever by an
easement, or right of use by a third party by the finding of a jury that such use
would be highly convenient, or that it was exercised by a former owner, or was
notorious, or any other ground short of strict necessity, the sanctity and secur-
ity of titles bydeeds, exact and precisein their terms, would be seriously shak-
enandimpaired. Therecordgives no notice of any such right or easement."10
Missouri cases involving easements by implication are not plentiful. A
general note on the subject appears in a previous number of the Law Series. 1
Practically all the Missouri cases are cases of implied grant. Only two cases
10. Wheeldon v. Burrows (1879,) L. R. 12 Ch. So. 588; Cherry v. Brizzolara (1909), 89 Ark. 309;
Div.31. Mitchell v. Seipel (1879), 53 Md. 251; Buss. v.
11. (1857) I Hurlstone & Norman 916. Dyer (1878), 125 Mass. 287; Brown v. Fuller
12. Suffield v. Brown (1864), 4 De G., J. & S. (1911) 165 Mich. 162, 130 N. W. 621; Denman v.
185; Crossley v. Lightowler (1867), L. R. 2 Ch. Mentz (1902), 63 N. J. Eq. 613, 52 At. 1117;
478; Wheeldon v. Burrows (1879), 12 Ch. Div. 31. Wells v. Garbott (1892), 132 N. Y. 430, 30 N. E.
13. 9 Ruling Case Law, Easements, page 765; 978; Howley v. Chaffee (1915). 88 Vt. 468, 93 At.
Steinke v. Bentley (1892), 6 Ind. App. 663, 34 120, L. R.A. 1915D, 1010.
N. E. 97; Powers v. Heffernan (1908), 233 I11. 15. Miller v. Hoesehler (1905), 126 Wis. 263,
597, 84 N. E. 661; Geible v. Smith (1891) 146 IOS N. W. 790.
Pa. St. 276, 23 At. 437; Rightsell v. Hale (1891), 16. Warren v. Blake (1866), 54 Me. 276.
90 Tenn. 556,18S. W. 245. 17. 7 Mo. Law Bull. 49.
14. Walker v. Clifford (1900), 128 Ala. 67, 29
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have been found in which the principle of an implied reservation is applicable,
and both are ways of necessity.18 The conclusion of the principal case seems the
proper one, and is consonant with the trend of the best considered inodern
authorities.
R.M.F.
ADVERSE POSSESSION-TITLE TO LAND BETWEEN FENCE
AND TRUE BOUNDARY. .4ckerman et al. v. Ryder.,
In an ejectment suit, defendant claimed title by adverse possession.
Plaintiff was an adjoining landowner, and both parties derived title from a
common source. A correct survey of the land conveyed showed that the
boundary line between the two tracts had been drawn upon the land of plaintiff
so as to include a few feet of his land within the defendant's enclosure. The
strip in controversy had been occupied by defendant and his predecessors in
title in ignorance of the true line for a period longer than was required by
statute. The jury found for defendant, but the trial court arrested judgment,
and, on appeal by defendant, this was affirmed by the Supreme Court. It
clearly appeared that the occupation was not adverse for at least a portion of
the statutory period. It was, therefore, not necessary for the Court to go
further, but it stated that "the record title to the disputed land is in respond-
ents... and the burden was therefore cast upon appellant to prove. .that she
and her grantors have held adverse possession of the disputed land for ten
years.. If appellant failed in this proof, then the trial court should have
directed a verdict for respondents..."2
"There are two different and distinct situations which may arise in a
boundary dispute, where the parties have held possession in ignorance of the
true line. If the intention has been to hold only to the true line, wherever that
may be, then the previously held line must yield to the correct line when ascer-
tained. But where the defendants and those under whom they derive title have,
for the statutory period, held possession up to a line claimed by them to be the
true line, such possession is adverse. The condition of the mind of a person who
claims a certain line as the true line is very different from that of one who
claims only to the true line, wherever that may be. In the mind of one the
boundary line is fixed. In the other it is subject to future ascertainment."
In the more usual case in which the grantee enters upon his land where the
boundary lines do not exactly coincide with those in his deed, he gives no
thought to the possibility that the boundaries of his lot are not located cor-
rectly. Since evidence is lacking in many cases as to what the party setting up
the statute of limitations actually claimed during the period required by the
statute, and as to what his predecessor in title claimed, it is important to
determine whether there is a presumption in favor of either party, and whether
the burden of proving the hostility of the claim rests upon him who sets up
the statute, or whether it devolves upon the record holder to prove that the
claim was not hostile, but subject to a future ascertainment of the true line.
18. Auxier v. Horn (1919), 213 S. IV. 100; 1. (192S) 308 Mo. 9. 271 S. W. 743.
BaumhotE v. Lochhass (1923), 253 S. W. 762. 2. Mangold v. Phllps, ct al.. (1916) 186
S. W. 988. i. C. 989.
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Upon this point the authorities are divided. A number of courts 3 have
followed the decision of the Iowa court4 and have required the adverse
claimant to strictly prove, the adverse character of his possession. The weight
of authority6 however, seems to be more nearly in accord with the view of tile
Indiana Courts that actual possession and occupation, even though under a
mistake as to the true boundary, will raise a presumption that the holding was
adverse.
The courts which deny the presumption in favor of the adverse holder
say that it ought not be be presumed that a man intends to do a wrongful act,
and, therefore, there is no presumption that one who occupies the land of
another claims that land as his own. Courts which allow the presumption
that the possession is adverse say that there should not be a premium placed
on intentional wrongdoing (such that only the man who claims the land of
another knowing of the other's ownership, can gain title adversely), but that he
who innocently occupies the land of another should have the benefit of the
presumption for practical reasons.
Not only are the authorities divided, but the cases in Missouri are not
clear and the Missouri court has reversed itself several times. The earlier view 7
in Missouri was that the adverse claimant must prove that he claimed up to the
boundary line against all the world without condition as to subsequent de-
velopments. A few of the later cases in Missouri, including the instant case,
have adopted this position. Most of the cases, s however, are contra, and the
growing tendency in Missouri until Ickerman v. Ryder was decided was that
"where adverse possession has been held for the statutory period up to a cer-
tain line, the burden is on the opposite party to show that such possession was
with the intention of claiming only to the true line." (186 S. W. 988). The
effect of these decisions is to place the burden on the holder of record title to
prove that the possession of the adverse claimant was not with an intent to
claim to the existing boundary. Other cases9 in Missouri, without purporting
to place this burden on the record holder, have in fact reached this result.
Where evidence of the intention of the adverse claimant and his predecessor to
3. Lecroix v. Malone, (1908) 157 Ala. 434, 47
So. 725; Williams v. Bernstein, (1899) 51 La.
Ann. 115, 25 So. 411; Edwards v. Fleming, (1911)
83 Kans. 653, 112 Pac. 836; Preble v. Maine
C. R. Co., (1893) 85 Me. 260, 27 Atl. 149;
Kirkman v. Brown, (1894) 93 Tenn. 476, 27
S. W. 709.
4. Grube v. Wells (1871) 34 Ia. 148.
5. Searles v. DeLadson (1908) 81 Conn. 133,
70 At!. 589; Krause v. Nolte, (1905) 217 III. 298,
75 N. E. 362; Diers v. Ward, (1902) 87 Minn. 475,
92 N. W. 402; Andrews v. Hastings, (1909) 85
Neb. 548, 123 N. W. 1035; Sommer v. Compton,
(1908) 52 Ore. 173, 96 Pat. 1065; Bruce v.
Washington, (1891) 80 Tex. 368, 15 S. W. 1104;
Hesser v. Seipman, (1904) 35 Wash. 14, 76
Pac. 295; Lucas v. Provines, (1900) 130 Cal. 270,
62 Pac. 509; Johnson v. Thomas, (1904) 23
App. D. C. 141.
6. Dyer et al v. Eldridge et al, (1893). 136 Ind.
654,36 N. E. 522.
7. Thomas et al. v. Babb et al (1870) 45 Mo.
384; Tamm v. Kellogg (1871) 49 Mo. 118;
Brummell v. Harris (1898) 148 Mo. 430, 50 S. W.
93; Stevenson v. Black et al (1902) 168 Mo. S49,
68 S. W. 909; Himmelberger-Harrison Lumber
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claimn up to the boundary would have been insufficient, the court has, in effect,
taken the position that actual occupation to the extent of the adverse claim,
especially when such occupation is by a permanent building, is sufficient
evidence of claim of title to make the possession adverse.
The better view is that taken by the majority of Missouri cases, and seems
to be the present tendency, although the case under review is conira. There
are many boundary lines in Missouri today that are not the true lines, be-
cause the land was poorly surveyed many years ago. If the defense of adverse
possession is difficult for the defendant to prove, this has a tendency to en-
courage those whose lands are held adversely to start suit. But if the burden is
upon the holder of the paper title to prove that his neighbor did not intend to
claim to the existing line, or if there is a presumption that one who occupies
to a given line in ignorance of the true line intends to claim to such given line,
then the holder of paper title is less likely to start suit, and this is, therefore,
the most practical rule.
G. S. W.
